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ON THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF 
POSITIVE FREEDOM AND ITS ROLE IN 
NORMATIVE DISCOURSE
Two concepts of freedom
The goal of this essay is to try to refute three main objections which can be 
raised against positive freedom. The fi rst objection says that the concept of posi-
tive freedom is irremediably vague. The second one asserts that positive freedom 
is unattractive as a personal ideal. The third objection says that positive freedom 
is dangerous as a political ideal. Before I deal with these three objections, let me 
present some introductory remarks on the concept of positive freedom. 
As is well known, positive freedom is one of two concepts of freedom (the 
other being negative freedom) analyzed by Isaiah Berlin in his famous essay Two 
Concepts of Liberty.1 The intuition that stands behind the distinction between 
negative and positive freedom is that we can use the term ‘freedom’ to describe 
two markedly different phenomena: either a situation which is external to an 
agent or an internal state of an agent. In the former case, by saying that an agent 
is free we mean that she would not encounter external (i.e. imposed by other 
persons) constraints if she wanted to act on various desires (those desires which 
she actually has and which she could have as a human being), i.e. is negatively 
free, whereas in the latter case by saying that an agent is free we mean that 
she ‘governs herself’ – is a true master of herself, i.e. is positively free. As can be 
easily seen, while the concept of negative freedom is relatively clear (though not 
devoid of some intricacies of its own, e.g. it is clear that negative freedom cannot 
be unlimited, though it is not clear where exactly those limits should be put), the 
concept of positive freedom – as presented above – is very unclear (what does it 
exactly mean to be a true master of oneself?). This is the reason why the concept 
of positive freedom needs explication more urgently than the concept of nega-
1  This essay can be found in a collection of Isaiah Berlin’s essays Four Essays on Liberty, 
Oxford University Press, London and New York 1969. Incidentally, it may be worthwhile noticing 
that, contrary to the oft-repeated opinion, the distinction between negative and positive freedom 
was not introduced by Berlin – it had been known to philosophers long before: Berlin’s great 
merit was to recall this distinction and to make a brilliant analysis of the relations between 
negative and positive freedom.
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tive freedom. Moreover, positive freedom understood as being a true master of 
oneself is not self-evidently attractive as a personal ideal (it is not obvious that 
being a true master of oneself is really a state to which we should aspire) and 
as a political ideal (Berlin’s claim that the ideal of positive freedom can easily 
be used by the authorities to justify the imposition of considerable limitations 
on our negative freedom may be right if this ideal is understood as being a true 
master of oneself: the authorities may justify the imposition of such limitations 
by pointing out that we cannot achieve by our own efforts the level of our ‘true 
or noumenal self’ – and thereby cannot be true masters of ourselves – if we are 
not deprived of those options which are likely to be selected by our ‘empirical 
self;’ I shall return to this problem at the end of this essay). The account of posi-
tive freedom which I would like to propose will be eclectic or compound, as it 
will draw on various accounts proposed in philosophical literature. However, it 
seems that only such an account of positive freedom can give justice to the multi-
layered character of the very phenomenon of positive freedom. I shall also argue 
that the concept of positive freedom, when viewed in its complexity, proves to be 
an attractive personal ideal and a non-dangerous and attractive political ideal. 
Traditional accounts of positive freedom
Before providing an account of the concept of positive freedom, let me briefl y 
present the main accounts of positive freedom proposed in philosophical litera-
ture. My presentation of these accounts will be very simplistic: I shall present 
only their essential features without going into subtleties of each of these ac-
counts and without analyzing the relations between these accounts. The fi rst 
account, which can be dubbed ‘Platonic,’ says that an agent is positively free if 
her reason controls her passions. This account does not require that our pas-
sions (the spirited (thumoeides) and the appetitive (épithumêtikon) part of our 
soul) should be extinguished but only that they should be controlled by reason 
(the rational (logistikon) part of our soul). The second account, which can be 
called ‘Stoic,’ says that an agent is positively free if she has reached the state of 
apátheia, i.e. if she has extinguished her passions, and thereby, as was empha-
sized especially by Epictetus, is not attached to things which are not dependent 
on us. A Stoic sage who has reached this state manifests amor fati: she does not 
want to change the course of events that happen to her but accepts it as good. 
The third account, which can be dubbed ‘Nietzschean,’ says that an agent is posi-
tively free if she is not a ‘reactive person,’ i.e. if she is free from ressentiment. 
The fourth account, which can be dubbed ‘Marcusean’ (as it can be ascribed, 
inter alia, to Herbert Marcuse) asserts that an agent is positively free if her 
goals – values to be realized by her – have been formed in the process not based 
on manipulation, pressure, ignorance, deceit, etc. The fi fth account, which can 
be called ‘axiological,’ says that an agent is positively free if her goals – values to 
be realized by her – are of special kind: they are high values. The sixth account, 
which can be dubbed ‘Socratic,’ says that an agent is positively free if her beliefs 
– regarding herself as well as the external world – are true beliefs. The seventh 
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account, which can be called (somewhat awkwardly) ‘akrasia-sensitive,’ asserts 
that an agent is positively free if she does not suffer from akrasia. The above list 
seems to include the main accounts proposed in philosophical literature (though 
this list could assuredly be supplemented with some other accounts). However, 
none of them, when considered in isolation, refl ects the whole richness of the 
phenomenon of positive freedom. In order to build a concept of positive free-
dom which would fully refl ect this phenomenon, one must therefore combine 
the above partial accounts. Before I make an attempt to build such a concept, 
however, I would like to point out that even though most of the above accounts 
seem uncontroversial, i.e. they can be rightly regarded as refl ecting some aspect 
of the rich phenomenon of positive freedom, one of them – the Stoic account – is 
highly controversial in this regard. More specifi cally, it is dubious if apátheia 
can plausibly be viewed as an expression of positive freedom; rather, it seems an 
expression of the lack thereof. In my view, which I cannot develop here at greater 
length, the Stoic account of positive freedom, which identifi es positive freedom 
with apátheia, is implausible: arguably, it refl ects the fear of or aversion to the 
unpredictability of human existence rather than ‘true’ positive freedom. For this 
reason, my account of positive freedom is not based directly on the Stoic account 
(though, apparently, it is not contradictory with this account).
A proposal of explication of the concept of positive freedom
I would like to propose two slightly different accounts of positive freedom 
which encompass the above partial accounts (except for the Stoic one); I shall call 
these two accounts ‘the strong concept of positive freedom’ and ‘the weak concept 
of positive freedom.’ I shall argue that the former is more plausible.
The strong concept of positive freedom assumes that an agent is positively free 
if and only if she satisfi es the following four conditions (which, apparently, are 
not entirely independent): the Procedural Condition, the Axiological Condition, 
the Reality Principle Condition and the Non-Akrasia Condition. I construe these 
conditions as necessary conditions of positive freedom and their conjunction as 
a necessary and suffi cient condition of positive freedom. They determine an ideal 
type of a positively free person: a person fully satisfying these four conditions can 
hardly ever be met in real life. However, for a person to be called ‘positively free’ 
it suffi ces if she satisfi es to a considerable degree these four conditions. Let me 
now discuss these conditions at greater length.
(1) The Procedural Condition (incorporating the Marcusean and Nietzschean 
accounts): an agent is positively free only if her goals – values to be realized by 
her – have been selected or at least endorsed by her as a result of her critical and 
autonomous (i.e. undisturbed by such external obstacles as e.g. manipulation, 
pressure, deceit, and such internal judgment-distorting obstacles as e.g. various 
psychological compulsions or ressentiment) refl ection on reasons for the accep-
tance of these goals and for the acceptance of alternative goals, so that the goals 
chosen by her can be called really ‘her own’ goals. 
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The Procedural Condition implies, inter alia, that one’s choice of goals should 
not be made in ignorance and thereby should be made in awareness of a wide 
range of alternative goals. Besides, this condition implies that an agent is not 
positively free when the formation of her goals occurs through a process which 
she does not control, or with which she does not identify (e.g., when she is re-
quired to do something by physical force, when she is coerced by threats to do 
something, when her psyche is conditioned by subjecting her to systematic indoc-
trination, when goals are imposed on her by subliminal advertising).
(2) The Axiological Condition (incorporating the axiological account): an agent 
is positively free only if she chooses values which occupy a high place in the hier-
archy of objective values. 
This condition is undoubtedly controversial, as it implies the existence of 
some hierarchy of objective values. How can this condition be developed? I see 
two main approaches to this problem – the more ambitious but less plausible and 
the less ambitious but more plausible. The fi rst approach consists of making an 
attempt to present some complete hierarchy of objective values. One may appeal 
in this context to subtle axiological analyses pursued by phenomenological phi-
losophers, e.g. Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann, who have made interesting 
suggestions as to how a hierarchy of objective values looks like. For instance, 
Scheler presented the following hierarchy of value modalities (with their respec-
tive positive and negative forms): from sensual values of the agreeable and disa-
greeable (the lowest values) through vital values of the noble and vulgar and 
spiritual values of the beautiful and ugly, true and false, to the values of the 
Holy – of the Divine and Idols (the highest values).2 What seems to be the main 
drawback of this approach is that it is overly ambitious: one may doubt if a hier-
archy ordering all objective values, i.e. a complete hierarchy of objective values, 
really exists, and if it does exist, if it can be discovered by human beings. The 
second approach consists of abandoning the attempt to present a complete hier-
archy of objective values and in confi ning oneself to presenting only a partial hi-
erarchy of values, e.g. to providing some criteria for distinguishing between high 
and low values. One may appeal in this context to the account of creative goals 
(which may be identifi ed with high values) proposed by Jon Elster.3 According to 
Elster, creative goals usually satisfy the following three conditions. First, they 
are subject to increasing marginal utility, i.e. they become more enjoyable, the 
more one has already engaged in realizing them. Thus, they are, for instance, 
opposite to passive consumption, since deriving sustained pleasure from passive 
consumption is possible only if the consumer has access to a diversity of goods. 
Second, they are esteemed by other people and thereby are the most important 
2  This hierarchy should be understood in the following way: the sensual value of the agree-
able is the lowest value in the hierarchy of positive value modalities and the sensual value of 
the disagreeable is the lowest value in the hierarchy of negative value modalities, etc.; thus, the 
highest value in the hierarchy of negative value modalities is in fact the ‘objectively lowest’ value 
in the total hierarchy of values; it means, e.g., that pursuing the value of the false is morally 
more reprehensible (according to Scheler) than pursuing the value of the vulgar. See M. Scheler, 
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Halle 1927 (fi rst published in 1913).
3  See J. Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
1986, pp. 45 and 194–195.
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source of self-esteem. Third, they benefi t other people. There seems to be also 
another important feature of creative goals not mentioned by Elster (but empha-
sized, e.g. by the eminent Polish philosopher Józef Tischner4), namely, that their 
realization is usually accompanied by an intense feeling of inner freedom. The 
occurrence of this feeling while realizing high values can be accounted for by the 
fact that these values are in a sense superfl uous from the practical standpoint – 
their realization is not necessary for biological existence (or, to put it differently, 
for normal functioning in everyday existence). Consequently, their realization 
seems to be a manifestation of a developed capacity to transcend the basic level 
of human existence. Precisely such a transcending seems to be the main source 
of an intense feeling of inner freedom. In other words, in the face of low values 
(to quote Tischner) ‘an agent must more and can less,’ while in the face of high 
values ‘an agent must less and can more:’ an agent is in a way determined by 
her biological nature to realize low values, which is why her realization of these 
values can hardly be regarded as a manifestation of her positive freedom, while 
she is in no way determined to realize high values, which is why her realiza-
tion of these values can plausibly be regarded as a manifestation of her positive 
freedom. 
It is also worth noticing that the Axiological Condition developed in line with 
the fi rst approach is obviously irreconcilable with Berlin’s thesis that many val-
ues are incommensurable (i.e. they cannot be ordered in a hierarchy) and incom-
patible (i.e. they cannot be realized at the same time), as this approach implies 
that all values are commensurable and thereby can be ordered in a hierarchy 
(though it does not imply that all values are compatible: it is hard to deny the 
fact that certain values, e.g. justice and mercy, fairness and welfare, temperance 
and courage can never – or at least seldom – be realized simultaneously). By 
contrast, the Axiological Condition developed in line with the second approach 
is more concordant with Berlin’s thesis, as this approach does not imply that all 
values are commensurable: it implies that some values are commensurable, so 
that we can distinguish between high and low values and thereby can provide 
a partial hierarchy of values, but it does not imply that high values themselves 
are commensurable and thereby does not imply that we can present a complete 
hierarchy of values, i.e. a hierarchy of all values. 
(3) The Reality Principle Condition (incorporating the Socratic account): an 
agent is positively free only if her beliefs regarding herself and the external world 
are true beliefs, i.e. if she has self-knowledge and the knowledge of the external 
world. 
I shall put forward three reasons for treating this condition as a condition of 
positive freedom. A pragmatic reason is that an agent whose beliefs are in fact 
various illusions regarding herself and the external world will fail to undertake 
utility-maximizing actions, i.e. will fail to be instrumentally rational (though it 
may be worth noticing that moderate self-deception, e.g. leading to overestimat-
ing one’s capacities, may in fact be conducive to an effective realization of one’s 
goals; some evolutionary biologists, e.g. Robert L. Trivers, claim that this kind 
4  See, e.g., J. Tischner, Spór o istnienie człowieka (A Controversy over the Existence of Man), 
Znak, Kraków 1998.
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of self-deception may be a biological adaptation5); and an agent can hardly be 
viewed as positively free if her actions are self-defeating, i.e. if they tend to fail 
to produce effects which the agent has intended them to produce. An ‘analyti-
cal’ reason for treating this condition (in so far as it refers to self-knowledge) as 
a condition of positive freedom is that an agent who lacks self-knowledge – who 
is e.g. driven by motives unknown to her – can hardly be called ‘a true master of 
herself:’ it seems that a true master of herself must, by defi nition, possess acute 
self-knowledge. Thus, one can say that a positively free person must comply with 
the Freudian maxim ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich werden.’ An ethical reason is that it 
seems to be an ethical imperative that an agent should not ‘escape from reality:’ 
such an escape seems to be a symptom of the lack of positive freedom.
(4) The Non-Akrasia Condition (incorporating the akrasia-sensitive account 
and, arguably, the Platonic account): an agent is positively free only if she does 
not suffer from akrasia. 
This condition needs clarifi cation, because akrasia can be understood in many 
different ways. In the relevant literature one can fi nd three main forms of akra-
sia which I shall call ‘akrasia sensu stricto,’ ‘akrasia sensu largo’ and ‘akrasia 
sensu largissimo.’ One can speak about akrasia sensu stricto with reference to 
a situation in which an agent did x rather than y at time t even though she was 
convinced at t that, all things considered, x was a better thing to do, and she was 
able to do x (which implies that she did not act compulsively). To put it briefl y, 
akrasia sensu stricto is acting non-compulsively against one’s better judgment. 
Akrasia sensu largo embraces akrasia sensu stricto as well as acting compul-
sively against one’s better judgement. Akrasia sensu largissimo embraces the 
two preceding forms of akrasia as well as the failure by an agent to realize her 
resolutions due to her natural inclinations which the resolutions were supposed 
to counteract (this last form of akratic behaviour was clearly distinguished from 
the other two forms by Richard Holton6). The failure to realize one’s resolutions 
is dubbed ‘diachronic intrapersonal confl ict’ as opposed to ‘synchronic intrap-
ersonal confl ict’ (which embraces non-compulsive and compulsive acts against 
one’s better judgment). It is not clear if akrasia sensu stricto is at all possible: its 
existence has been denied by many thinkers (e.g. by Socrates and Richard Hare). 
There is no doubt, though, that compulsive acts against one’s better judgment 
and failures to act on one’s resolutions are real and frequent phenomena. There 
is also no doubt that an agent who systematically displays such behaviours can 
hardly be called ‘positively free.’
The weak concept of positive freedom assumes that an agent is positively 
free if she satisfi es the following three conditions: the Procedural Condition, the 
Reality Principle Condition, the Non-Akrasia Condition.
There arises the question of which of the two concepts of positive freedom is 
more plausible. As can be readily seen, the difference between these concepts is 
that the weak concept does not require that values chosen by the agent should 
5  See R.L. Trivers, The Elements of a Scientifi c Theory of Self-Deception [in:] D. LeCroy 
and P. Moller (eds.), Evolutionary Perspectives on Human Reproductive Behaviour, New York 
Academy of Sciences, New York 2000, pp. 114–131.
6  See R. Holton, Intention and Weakness of Will, “The Journal of Philosophy” 1999, vol. 96, 
no. 5, pp. 241–262.
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be high values, whereas the strong concept implies this requirement. Thus, the 
aforementioned question boils down in fact to the question about the plausibility 
of the Axiological Condition (arguably, the most controversial among the four 
conditions of positive freedom). As I have already argued, there are important 
reasons for assuming this condition. First, even though we may not be able to 
present a complete hierarchy of objective values (either because such a hierar-
chy does not exist or because we cannot know this hierarchy), we may be able 
to present a partial hierarchy of objective values which allows us to distinguish 
between high and low values. Second, and more importantly, the realization of 
high values gives rise to an especially strong feeling of inner freedom. An agent 
usually lacks this feeling – or experiences only its faint form – while realizing 
low values. Therefore, the realization of high values seems to be an important 
component of the phenomenon of positive freedom. Thus, the concept of positive 
freedom which is to refl ect this phenomenon in all its complexity should allow 
for this condition.
Objections against positive freedom
I started this essay with the assertion that the objections raised against posi-
tive freedom – that it is irremediably vague, that it is unattractive as a personal 
ideal, and that it is dangerous as a political ideal – can be refuted. I hope that 
the above analyses constitute a refutation of the fi rst objection. What remains to 
be done is to deal with the other two objections. 
The objection saying that positive freedom is not attractive as a personal ideal 
is diffi cult to refute because it is diffi cult to provide criteria for assessing a given 
personal ideal – a given conception of good life – as attractive or unattractive. 
However, if one agrees that the notion of happiness construed (to paraphrase 
Glenn Gould’s famous saying) not ‘as the collection of momentary ejections of 
adrenaline but as the gradual, lifelong construction of a state of wonder and 
serenity’ might be one of such criteria, one could argue that the strong concept 
of positive freedom is an attractive ideal, because its realization seems to be es-
pecially conducive to thus construed happiness. This does not amount to saying 
that this ideal is entirely uncontroversial. I can imagine at least three lines of 
its critique. 
First, it may be argued that this ideal cannot be realized: what an agent 
ought to be according to this ideal she cannot be. In other words, its attractions 
notwithstanding, the ideal of positive freedom is utopian, as it cannot be ac-
complished. The reason is, so this argument (which can be called ‘the argument 
from unfeasibility’) goes, because this ideal implies (in the form of its Procedural 
Condition) an untenable dualist view of the human self according to which the 
self occupies a transcendental realm from which it descends to the world of ev-
eryday experience to choose between various goals, whereas in fact we always 
acquire our goals within a specifi c way of life and thereby can never transcend 
all social and historical infl uences and choose our goals truly autonomously. 
Moreover, even if we could choose high values autonomously, we would rarely 
ON THE MEANING OF THE CONCEPT OF POSITIVE FREEDOM...
192 Wojciech Załuski 
realize them (as is required by the Non-Akrasia Condition), because such a real-
ization requires us to manifest certain features, e.g. perseverance in developing 
one’s creative potentialities and thereby the ability to delay gratifi cation, with 
which most of us are rather poorly endowed. However, these two arguments are 
not very plausible. As for the fi rst argument: the ideal of positive freedom does 
not imply the strongly dualistic self mentioned in this argument; it just requires 
that human beings refl ectively and critically choose their goals. As for the sec-
ond argument: one should concede that this ideal can never by fully realized but 
one should add that this argument is trivially correct, given that it seems to be 
a feature of probably all noble personal ideals – conceptions of good life – that 
they cannot be fully realized. 
Second, one may argue that the realization of this ideal may give rise to con-
ceit or arrogance. Indeed, it may be the case that an agent who is positively free 
but devoid of humility (which can be defi ned, tentatively, as an attitude towards 
life which consists in treating the goods of life not as something due but as gifts) 
may not be a very agreeable person. Thus, it may the case that an even more 
attractive ideal is the one which combines the above four conditions constituting 
the strong concept of positive freedom with what may be called ‘the Requirement 
of Humility.’ 
Third, one may argue that the realization of some types of high values (e.g., 
some artistic achievements) might not have been possible if those who real-
ized them had been endowed with full positive freedom, especially with acute 
self-knowledge and refl exivity, which are required by The Reality Principle 
Condition of positive freedom (for instance, as Berlin pointed out in his essay 
From Hope and Fear Set Free,7 van Gogh or Dostoyevsky might not have created 
their masterpieces if it had not been for their serious fl aws in self-knowledge). 
This is undoubtedly true. However, the thesis that the ideal of positive freedom 
is attractive does not entail the untenable claim that there are no other valuable 
conceptions of good life.
At the end of this essay let me deal with the last objection against positive 
freedom – the objection saying that positive freedom is dangerous as a political 
ideal. As I have already mentioned, Berlin maintained that the concept of posi-
tive freedom is dangerous as a political ideal, because it can be used to justify the 
limitations of our negative freedom for the sake of the realization of ‘our true self’ 
in case (real or imagined) we cannot achieve the level of ‘our true or noumenal 
self’ by our own efforts. Berlin’s scepticism towards positive freedom, however, 
seems to be justifi ed only with reference to some accounts of positive freedom, 
namely, those that posit some distinction between the ‘true or noumenal self’ 
and ‘the empirical self,’ not with reference to all accounts of positive freedom. 
Apparently, the account of positive freedom proposed in this essay cannot be 
used to justify the imposition of constraints on our negative freedom, because 
this account includes the Procedural Condition, which requires that agents se-
lect their goals – values to be realized by them – as a result of their autonomous 
deliberations, i.e. deliberations pursued in the absence of any external coercion. 
7  This essay can be found in a collection of Isaiah Berlin’s essays Concepts and Categories: 
Philosophical Essays, Hogarth Press, London 1978.
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However, this argument only shows that positive freedom is not dangerous as 
a political ideal. I think, though, that a stronger claim can be made, namely, 
the claim that positive freedom is not only non-dangerous as a political ideal 
but is also attractive as a political ideal. The political ideal of positive freedom 
can be interpreted either as an imperative addressed directly to the state to 
pursue a policy which favours the fl ourishing of positively free individuals or, 
more moderately, just as a criterion of evaluating social orders. The latter inter-
pretation seems to be more reasonable, because it is rather diffi cult to say how 
the realization of this ideal by the state ought to look like in practice. Moreover, 
and more importantly, one may argue (from the perspective of an adherent of 
liberalism) that it is not possible to reconcile liberalism (which assumes that the 
state should not support any conception of good life but, rather, should create 
conditions for developing various conceptions of good life) with the suggestion 
that the state should pursue the ideal of positive freedom – one of many (even 
if especially attractive) conceptions of good life. For all these reasons the second 
interpretation seems to be more convincing. What stands behind the claim that 
the ideal of positive freedom may be treated as a criterion of evaluating social 
orders is a plausible (at least prima facie) axiological intuition that the more 
a given social order is conducive to the fl ourishing of positively free individuals, 
the more valuable it is.
